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Concerns about devolving environmental regulatory powers to lower levels of government
permeate debates in the U.S. and Europe about the appropriate level of regulatory authority. In
theory, given a long list of conditions, regulatory competition by local governments can be
efficient in the same way that tax competition can be efficient: local welfare-maximizing
governments set the same standards or taxes as would an omniscient welfare-maximizing central
government. In practice, however, these conditions are improbable, especially in the case of
environmental regulations, and local competition is potentially inefficient. In the past two years,
evidence has begun to emerge regarding the empirical importance of these inefficiencies. In this
paper, I describe this nascent literature, drawing parallels to the tax competition literature,
suggest some avenues for empirical research, and present some new results.
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Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence
Whether environmental regulations are better set centrally or locally is a subject of debate
both in the U.S., which in recent years has devolved some environmental authority from the
federal government to the States, and in Europe, which is in the midst of centralizing authority
for some environmental rules. Proponents of decentralized standards claim that local
policymakers have better information about local concerns, while opponents claim that
competition among jurisdictions will lead to a "race to the bottom" in environmental quality.
This issue, whether decentralized authority results in inefficient standards, in theory and in
practice, is the subject of this paper.
The theoretical literature on interjurisdictional regulatory competition is well established,
has been well surveyed (Wilson, 1996, 1999; Oates, 2001), and has a long history in the parallel
literature on fiscal federalism and tax competition. In the simplest economic models, in which
local jurisdictions compete for mobile capital while at the same time taxing that capital to
provide public goods or regulating that capital to protect the environment, the competition leads
to Pareto-efficient outcomes. However, those models rely on a long list of assumptions without
which outcomes are inefficient. As a consequence, the lesson I take from the theoretical
literature is that under most pertinent real-world situations, local standard setting will in theory
lead to inefficient environmental regulatory competition.
The empirical question then is how important is this potentially inefficient regulatory
competition? How strategically do local governments behave when they set their environmental
standards? While some research has been conducted in recent years in the area of tax2
competition, for environmental regulatory competition this question has been left almost
completely unanswered, for several obvious reasons. First, in order to document the degree to
which states take other states' regulations into account when setting their own standards, we need
information on regulatory stringency across states and over time. Until the last few years, no
such data existed. Second, we need to be able to differentiate strategic behavior from
correlations caused by unobserved phenomena affecting groups of neighboring states.
In this paper I briefly summarize the theoretical literature on tax and regulatory
competition, and the few articles in this emerging empirical literature. Then I describe two new
data sets that document regulatory stringency in U.S. states over time, and present some new
empirical work that tries to measure the extent of strategic interstate environmental regulatory
competition. Along the way I point out conceptual and econometric hurdles that anybody
tackling this problem will need to address in future work.
I. A brief overview of the theory.
The 1971 Economic Report of the President (CEA, 1971) seemed to inaugurate the
debate by arguing that
Many... pollution problems are local in character, and therefore determination of
the appropriate level of environmental quality is likely to be more accurate if it is
done locally rather than by the Federal Government.
The merits of this assertion were debated in several subsequent issues of the American Economic
Review (Stein, 1971; Peltzman and Tideman, 1972). Most of that debate, however, compared the
benefits of decentralized policies against the costs of a uniform federal policy. Proponents of1Before Oates, most models of local public good provision stemmed from Tiebout (1956),
which modeled mobile citizens who, by "voting with their feet," force local governments to
provide efficient quantities of public goods. More relevant to tax and regulatory competition,
however, is Oates' example, where citizens are associated uniquely with states, and states
compete to attract investment.
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federal standard-setting argued that compliance with a patchwork of different local regulations
would be expensive for businesses that manufacture or market their products nationally.
If these were the only issues at stake, then choosing the optimal degree of devolution
would be a purely empirical exercise, though admittedly complicated. We would need to weigh
the information advantage enjoyed by local regulators against the compliance costs associated
with heterogeneous local regulations. There are, however, two important caveats. First, nothing
dictates that a federal regulation be uniform. Sigman (2003) notes in this volume that virtually
all states are authorized to implement the federal Clean Water Act at the state level, leaving them
room to interpret and enforce the national law with different degrees of enthusiasm. Even the
federal Clean Air Act, which sets uniform national air quality standards, imposes starkly different
costs on individual counties, depending on the ease with which counties can meet the standards.
Moreover, even if we allow heterogeneous federal regulations, and grant the federal regulator the
same information as the local regulators, there remains the potential for regions to compete with
one another to attract investment on the basis of their environmental costs.
In 1972, Oates' book Fiscal Federalism, provided a model designed to examine
federalism, tax competition, and local public good provision. He considered a world in which
citizens are immobile, but capital moves freely among jurisdictions, and in which local
governments provide local public goods financed by taxes.
1 Oates's key insight is that under
federalism, given the proper assumptions, all taxes become benefits taxes, and that redistributive4
policies are impossible at the local level. "Attempts to tax the relatively wealthy more heavily
than the poor will fail to some degree because of the departure of those on whom the tax places
the largest liability" (Oates, 1972). A nice intuitive explanation for this result is in McLure
(1986). Imagine what would happen if Gloucester, Massachusetts attempted to finance its school
lunch program with a property tax on fishing boats docking there. No matter how meritorious
the lunch program, boats would likely seek to dock in nearby ports that did not appropriate their
income and redistribute it to school children.
Though not explicitly addressing environmental competition, Oates's model of tax
competition is directly applicable. Relabel the local public good "environmental quality," and
reconfigure the tax as a Pigouvian tax, and tax competition becomes environmental regulatory
competition, with local officials regulating local environments. Described this way,
environmental competition seems even less likely to result in efficiency than tax competition.
Environmental problems involve externalities, and correcting those externalities redistributes
welfare from polluters to the victims of pollution. If under fiscal federalism, redistributive
policies are impossible due to tax competition, then under environmental federalism, efficient
environmental regulations will be equally impossible due to regulatory competition.
In the face of this logic, Oates and Schwab's (1988) paper seems contradictory. They
describe many jurisdictions competing to attract a fixed amount of capital. Capital benefits the
jurisdictions by raising the local wage, but degrades the local environment. To limit pollution,
regulators set emissions caps that reduce the return to capital. This lowers the quantity of capital
attracted to the jurisdiction, in turn lowering the marginal product of labor and local wages.
Faced with a trade-off between environmental quality and wage income, regulators maximize2This results parallels the international trade literature on strategic substitution between
environmental regulations and tariffs (Ederington, 2001; Ederington and Minier, 2002).
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local welfare by setting regulations so that the marginal gain from attracting capital equals its
marginal environmental cost. This decentralized outcome is then shown to be socially efficient
from the perspective of all jurisdictions.
How can Oates (1972) conclude that redistributive local policies are impossible under
federalism, and Oates and Schwab (1988) conclude that local environmental policies are
efficient? The trick is that Oates and Schwab's basic model internalizes all externalities. All of
the citizens of a region work in its polluting industry. Each suffers equally from pollution.
Capital is supplied competitively, and labor is fixed in the jurisdiction, so all production rents are
earned by labor. Each citizen effectively decides how much to tax himself to reduce pollution
that he alone suffers. Without these simplifying and externality-internalizing assumptions, the
efficiency result evaporates.
Later in the paper Oates and Schwab consider three complications, each of which revives
the inefficiency of redistributional local policies. First, they place constraints on the tax
instruments available to the local government. If some public good must be financed with a tax
on mobile capital, this is analagous to financing school lunches by taxing fishing boats. The
local government can compensate for the capital tax that exceeds the benefits to capital by easing
environmental controls.
2 By easing the environmental regulation sufficiently to offset the capital
tax, the locality redistributes no welfare from capital to local citizens, suffers no loss of
investment, and effectively "pays" for the public good by incurring environmental damage.6
Second, Oates and Schwab consider local governments with goals other than maximizing
local welfare. If the objective is maximizing tax revenue (a so-called "Leviathon" model), the
government will want to ease environmental regulations in order to attract capital and inflate the
tax base. These arguments always seem tautological to me: governments that do not maximize
welfare impose inefficient policies, where efficiency is defined by welfare-maximization.
Third, Oates and Schwab consider local jurisdictions populated by heterogeneous
citizens: some work in the polluting industry, as before, while others simply collect exogenous
income. Under majority rule, if the median voter works in the polluting industry, environmental
regulations will be overly lax, while if the median voter does not, the regulations will be too
strict. This result stems from the fact that the local government is no longer welfare-maximizing
-- instead it maximizes the welfare of only the larger group. A potential Pareto-improving trade
would make both groups better off. However, the welfare maximizing environmental regulation
involves redistributing some welfare from mobile capital and factory workers to the victims of
pollution. As before, this type of redistribution is not possible at the local level. In each of these
three versions of the basic model, some constraint (tax instrument limitations, Leviathon local
governments, majority rule) forces the local government to enact redistributive environmental
policies, which under federalism turn out to be inefficient.
Oates and Schwab model many competing jurisdictions, but what if there are only a few?
In an alternative model with only two jurisdictions, a polluting manufacturer decides whether to
locate in one jurisdiction and export goods to the other, or to locate in both jurisdictions
(Markusen, et al., 1995). The firm trades off transport costs against the fixed costs of building a
second factory. The jurisdictions trade off the consumer surplus from hosting the factory against3See footnote 7 of Markusen et al. (1995).
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the pollution generated by the factory. If the consumer surplus is large (shipping costs are large),
both jurisdictions compete for a factory, driving down environmental regulations below globally
optimal (Pigouvian) levels. If the pollution costs are large, both jurisdictions compete to avoid
hosting the factory by raising environmental regulations above the globally optimal (Pigouvian)
levels. This latter case has been described as a "race to the top" in standard stringency.
The inefficiency results of Markusen, et al. depends on two phenomena. First is the
"small numbers" case. With only two jurisdictions, each has monopoly power if it can attract the
only manufacturer. The host jurisdiction can appropriate some of the monopoly rents for its
citizens by taxing output, or by imposing an environmental tax that exceeds the marginal social
damage of pollution. Second, in Markusen et al. the polluting manufacturer's monopoly rents are
earned by the outside "world" and thus disappear from the model altogether.
3 The only way that
a region can retain those rents is by taxing the output of the polluting producer. The tax thus
serves two purposes: to raise revenue from the monopolist and to reduce pollution. Competing
to attract plants, the regions bid down the amount of the monopolist's profits they retain,
impeding their ability to tax pollution. Regulatory competition thus has two adverse effects on
the regions' welfare: tax revenues fall and pollution increases.
While both regions are worse-off in the Nash equilibrium, relative to if immobile plants
had been assigned to jurisdictions, the profits of the producer increase as a result of the lower
taxes. Since these profits go to owners outside the model, the regional regulators ignore them.
Unlike the Oates and Schwab model, where regulators trade off pollution damage against rents4In Levinson (1997), I rewrite the Markusen et al. model so that the monopoly rents are
earned locally, leaving only one source of inefficiency, the monopoly deadweight loss.
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earned by immobile local labor, the Markusen et al. regulators tax profits that would otherwise
vanish outside of their region.
An example may clarify this distinction. Oates and Schwab model many small states
competing for investment on an efficient global capital market. They play a zero-sum game --
investment that goes to state i is attracted away from state j. Markusen et al. depict the type of
tax breaks and regulatory waivers states have offered to attract foreign automobile plants. With
the investment coming from abroad (outside the model), the regions seek to capture through
taxation economic rents that would otherwise disappear, and by competing the regions decrease
their ability to do so. As a consequence, the regions lower their ability to regulate efficiently the
pollution from such plants.
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One way to summarize the theoretical literature on environmental regulatory competition,
and tax competition more broadly, is to list the conditions under which local authority leads to
the same Pareto-optimal environmental regulations as would a welfare maximizing centralized
authority.
i. No cross-border externalities.
ii. Many jurisdictions.
iii. All economic rents earned locally by the competing jurisdictions.
iv. Welfare-maximizing local regulators.
v. No constraints on available policy instruments.
vi. No redistributive policies. (All taxes are benefits taxes.)
If these conditions are violated, then in theory interjurisdictional competition can lead to
inefficient taxation, public good provision, and environmental policies. For the case of public
good provision, I can imagine particular local programs where these conditions might be met:9
local parks, public libraries, police and fire services, etc. For environmental regulations,
however, it is hard to imagine a situation meeting all six conditions. This is why my one-
sentence summary of this theoretical literature is that under most pertinent real-world situations,
local standard setting has the potential to lead to inefficient environmental regulatory
competition.
How important is this potentially inefficiency? That depends on how strategically local
governments behave when setting their environmental standards, an empirical question.
II. Evidence to date.
In order for the theoretical inefficiency to matter empirically, two things must happen: (1)
investment must react to environmental regulatory differences across jurisdictions, and (2)
governments must react strategically to their neighbors' regulations. The environmental
regulatory competition literature contains numerous papers estimating the first of these: the effect
of regulations on economic outcomes (investment, plant locations, FDI, employment, etc.). Until
recently, economists found very little evidence that any of these activities responded to
environmental regulations (Jaffe et al., 1995). In the last few years, though, papers using panels
of data, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of regulations, have begun
to measure statistically significant, economically meaningful effects of environmental
regulations.
Among recent papers that find measurable large effects of environmental regulations,
Becker and Henderson (2000) is perhaps the most notable. They use the federal 1977 Clean Air
Act as a natural experiment to study the effect of stringent pollution regulations. The act imposes10
uniform national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), and requires counties whose air quality
does not meet the federal NAAQS to impose strict regulations on new sources of pollution.
Counties whose air quality meets the federal standards face much less stringent regulations.
Becker and Henderson show that counties with "non-attainment" status saw 26 to 45 percent
fewer new plants births in four heavily polluting industries between 1963 and 1992. Greenstone
(2001), follows a similar strategy and finds that between 1972 and 1987, non-attainment counties
lost 590 thousand jobs and $75 billion (1987$) worth of output from polluting industries, relative
to attainment counties that faced less stringent compliance costs. Keller and Levinson (2002) use
a continuous measure of environmental compliance costs in individual U.S. states (as opposed to
the zero-one measure of attainment status). They demonstrate that states with relatively higher
compliance costs saw a decline in both the value and count of new, polluting foreign investment
projects between 1977 and 1994.
Almost no papers, however, estimate the second empirical component of regulatory
competition: the effect of environmental regulations on the regulations of neighboring
jurisdictions. Three recent papers attempt to do so indirectly by using the Reagan
administration's policy of devolving environmental regulatory authority to the states as a natural
experiment in federalism (Millimet, 2001; List and Millimet, 2002; List and Gerking, 2000). In
1981 and 1982 state governments were delegated responsibility for the vast majority of
hazardous air pollution standards and New Source Performance standards, and from 1981 to
1984 federal appropriations to the national EPA fell by 11.5 percent (Millimet 2001). Evidence
for this shift can be seen in figure 1, which plots real (1985) expenditures on environmental
regulation and monitoring by state and federal governments from 1972 to 1994. The early 1980s11
saw a sharp decline in federal spending on environmental regulations, relative to state spending.
The assumption of these three papers, therefore, is that if regulatory competition results in a race
to the bottom, we should see a decline in environmental quality starting in 1981.
All three papers estimate NOx and SO2 emissions as a function of state characteristics
and test whether the post-1980 Reagan era of federalism yields different results. None of the
three find evidence that these two measures of air pollution worsened during the post-1980
period, which the authors interpret as evidence that devolving authority to the states did not result
in a race to the bottom. And one of the papers (Millimet, 2001) finds evidence that NOx
emissions declined after 1980, which is taken as possible evidence for a "race to the top."
If, however, we understand inefficient regulatory competition to mean that local
jurisdictions set inefficient standards, then there is no presumption that regulatory competition
will cause environmental quality to either improve or decline over time. The important question
is more subtle than whether emissions go up or down. It is whether interjurisdictional
competition and the Reagan decentralization caused regulations to be laxer than if they had been
set by a welfare maximizing central planner. Put slightly differently, there are a lot of reasons
why emissions of NOx and SO2 might have increased or decreased during the 1980s, including
oil price fluctuations, the implementation of the 1977 Clean Air Act, and changes in automobile
emissions standards. A more direct theoretical implication of the 1990's environmental
devolution is that after 1990, environmental standard stringency in individual states should have
become more responsive to the stringency of neighboring states.
To get at this more direct implication of regulatory competition, we need a panel of data
on states' regulatory stringency. For previous projects, I have created two such panels that can be5See Brueckner (2001) and Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) for estimations of analogous
tax reactions functions.
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used for this purpose. The first is an index of relative state-level pollution abatement costs from
1977 to 1994, controlling for differences in states' industrial compositions (Levinson, 2001). The
second is a panel of state hazardous waste disposal tax rates from 1989 to 1995 (Levinson, 1999).
One previous paper in this literature (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002a) has used my
(2001) index in a test of regulatory federalism. Briefly, the index is greater than 1 for a given
state if pollution abatement costs in that state are higher than would be predicted based on its
industrial composition, and less than 1 otherwise. A more complete description is in the
appendix.
Fredriksson and Millimet estimate an environmental regulatory reaction function that is
the analog to a tax reaction function:
(1)
where Eit is my index of environmental regulatory stringency for state i at time t, "i are state fixed
effects, (t are time dummies, Tijt are weights assigned to other states' regulatory indices Ejt ,a n d
xit are a set of state characteristics.
5 The coefficient of interest, *, tells us the degree to which
changes in environmental stringency are correlated with changes in neighboring states'
environmental stringency, all else equal.
Two econometric problems arise in trying to estimate (1). First, neighboring states are
likely to have unobserved regional characteristics in common that are correlated with regulatory
stringency (E). This will bias estimates of * in favor of finding a spurious relationship. One13
could easily mistake regional correlations for strategic behavior. A partial solution to this
problem is to include state fixed effects, which control for time invariant regional
heterogeneity.  Doing  so  requires  a  panel  of  regulatory  stringency  across  jurisdictions  over
time, which until recently was unavailable.
The second econometric problem with estimating (1) is the endogeneity of regulatory
stringency (E). If Ei is a function of Ej , then Ej must also be a function of Ei, and OLS estimates
of * will be biased. The standard solution to this problem is to instrument for Ej in (1) using the
weighted characteristics of the neighboring states. In particular
(2)
where GwijtXtj is a weighted average of a vector of state i's neighbors' characteristics. The fitted
values of GwijtEtj can then be used as instruments in (1). This technique is used in the context of
tax competition by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) and Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), for
example, and in the context of environmental regulatory competition by Fredriksson and
Millimet (2002a).
Fredriksson and Millimet estimate versions of equation (1) and (2) with lags, various
weighting schemes, regional partitions of the data, asymmetric responses to increases and
decreases in regulatory stringency, and instrumental variables for other states' stringency to
control for simultaneity and unobserved regional variations. They find that changes in
compliance costs are correlated spatially (the coefficient * is positive and statistically
significant), suggesting that states respond to increases in neighboring states' environmental
regulations by increasing their own regulations. Furthermore, these reactions appear stronger to14
neighbors with high costs than to those with low costs, and many of the measured responses are
greater than one-for-one (*>1).
Moreover, Fredriksson and Millimet are careful to note that while evidence of correlated
compliance costs may demonstrate regulatory competition, it is not sufficient to ascertain
whether competition leads to inefficiently high or low environmental regulations.
III. Some new evidence.
This section presents two extensions of Fredriksson and Millimet's work. First, I
combine their idea of looking at correlations among states' compliance costs with List and
Gerking's idea of treating the Reagan administration's devolution of environmental authority as a
natural experiment. Fredriksson and Millimet estimate conditional correlations among state
standards, but cannot ascertain how much is due to regulatory competition. List and Gerking
estimate the effect of the Reagan devolution on environmental quality, but not on regulatory
competition. If regulatory competition increased starting in 1981, the slopes of the regulatory
reaction functions, measured by Fredriksson and Millimet, will also have increased.
Table 1 presents some regressions of this type. The dependent variable is my index of
state compliance costs. The index is based on a measure of the pollution abatement compliance
costs in each state, gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau's published Pollution Abatement
Capital Expenditure Survey (PACE). It is the ratio of actual pollution abatement costs in a state,
to predicted pollution abatement costs, where the prediction is based solely on each state's6See the appendix for a brief summary, or Levinson (2001) for details.
7The index of compliance costs is normalized to 1.0 every year, so there is no need for the
year fixed effects. (When included they are statistically insignificant and tiny.)
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industrial composition. The index is greater than 1 if manufacturers in the state spend more on
pollution abatement that would be expected given industries represented in the state.
6
In table 1, I weight other states' compliance cost indices with the inverse of the squared
distance between the states. (In terms of equation (1), Tij=1/dij
2, where dij is the distance in miles
from state i to state j.) Other right-hand side variables in column (2) include state unemployment
rates, state agricultural land values, production wages, gross state product, population, and per
capita personal income.
7 A first-stage estimation of equation (2) generates fitted weighted
averages of other states' environmental regulatory stringency. The coefficient on this
instrumental variable is 0.92, suggesting that when nearby states' regulatory stringency rises, the
state in question is likely to raise its stringency by nearly the same amount. Changes in
environmental compliance costs appear highly correlated among neighboring states, even after
controlling  for  unobserved  state  heterogeneity,  and  for  the  endogeneity  of  the  regulations.
In similar specifications, Fredriksson and Millimet find elasticities in the range of 1.9. A
10 percent increase in neighbors' abatement costs leads to a 19 percent increase in one's own
costs. Reaction function elasticities in table 1 are slightly less than unity. (The mean of both the
dependent variable and the other states' indexes is 1.0.) One explanation for Fredriksson and
Millimet's stronger findings is that they focus on contiguous neighbors, while I have taken a
weighted average of all states, weighted by the inverse of the squared distance. It remains to be8The reaction function slope after 1981 remains large (0.866) and statistically significant.
That calculation is at the bottom of table 1.
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explained however, why a state might raise its stringency more than one-for-one in reaction to a
neighbor's stringency increase.
To combine Fredriksson and Millimet's approach with the insight of List and Gerking,
column (3) of table 1 interacts the weighted average of other states' environmental regulations
with a dummy variable for the post-1981 era, in which the Reagan administration devolved much
environmental policy to the states. After 1981, the coefficient on neighboring states' regulations
seems to decrease, suggesting that reaction functions got a tiny bit less steep, though the
coefficient estimate on the interaction term is not statistically significant.
8 This could be for a
variety of reasons. The Reagan administration reduced federal transfers to states for the purposes
of environmental regulations (Millimet 2001), perhaps decreasing the ability of states to
compete. The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments included a provision called "prevention of
significant deterioration" designed specifically to prevent states whose air quality was cleaner
that the national standards from attracting industry away from states whose air quality failed to
meet the national standards, and in the process degrading their own environments (Pashigian,
1985). Whatever the case, it does not appear from table 1 that these environmental reaction
functions steepened significantly after 1981.
As a second expansion of Fredriksson and Millimet, I examine a particular measure of
regulatory stringency, hazardous waste (HW) disposal taxes. I have collected data on state HW
tax rates from 1989 to 1995. Hazardous waste has been among the fastest growing components
of environmental compliance costs in the U.S. (Council on Environmental Quality, 1995), and in9For more detail, see Levinson (1999a, 1999b).
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recent years many states have substantially increased the rate at which they tax disposal of
hazardous waste, and a few have imposed higher taxes on waste imported from other states.
Moreover, hazardous waste disposal imposes large perceived costs and few benefits on local
jurisdictions, and can be expected to result in regulatory competition to deter pollution activities-
-a "race to the top" in environmental stringency.
9
One curious feature of HW taxes that may be useful here is that states have attempted to
tax disposal of waste by out-of-state generators at higher rates than for in-state generators. This
tax asymmetry takes two forms. Before 1992 when the Supreme Court ruled the practice
unconstitutional, many states explicitly imposed higher taxes on disposal of waste by out-of-state
entities than they imposed on local waste generators. Since 1992 the asymmetry has taken more
subtle forms. Some states charge waste generation taxes on in-state polluters and then impose
those generation taxes on waste imported into the state for disposal. Other states charge disposal
taxes that are the higher of local disposal costs or what those fees would have been had the
destination state shipped waste back to the origin state. Either way, these represent prima facie
evidence that states are behaving competitively when setting at least one environmental
regulation. It remains to be seen whether they are also behaving strategically.
Table 2 estimates equation (1) for hazardous waste taxes. In column (2) I present the
analog to column (2) of table 1. The key regressor is a weighted average of other states' HW
taxes, and the weights are the inverse of the square of the distance (Tij=1/dij
2). Table 2 also
includes industry and year fixed effects. Here the year fixed effects are important because HW
taxes change year-to-year, unlike the stringency index used in table 1 which averages 1.0 every18
year by construction. The coefficient on other states' HW taxes (0.17) in column 2 is positive but
not statistically significant.
Column (3) of table 2 estimates a version of equation (1) in which the weights are the
total amount of HW shipped from state i to other states over the six-year period for which I have
data. The idea is that states' competitors may not necessarily be their closest neighbors (Case et
al., 1993). Consequently, I estimate tax rates as a function of the tax rates of states with whom
each state trades most. When the T's in equation (1) are a function of distances among states, as
in table 1 and the first columns of table 2, they are clearly exogenous. However, when the T's
are a function of the tonnage of state-to-state shipments they are likely be endogenous. Here
again the asymmetry is of use. Consider estimating the tax charged by state i as a function of the
tax charged on other states j. If the weight on state j's tax rate is shipments from state j to state i,
then it will be endogenous. However, if the weight on state j's tax rate is shipments from state i
to state j, then it should not be. (State i's tax should not affect shipments from i to j.) The
coefficient in column (3), 0.078, however, remains small and statistically insignificant.
The reaction functions look somewhat different, however, when we compare them before
and after the 1992 Supreme Court decision prohibiting discriminatory taxation. One way to view
this is that before 1992 there was no particular reason to raise one's own disposal tax in response
to a neighbor. Instead, states could simply raise the tax they charge other states for disposal,
while leaving disposal taxes low for waste generated locally. Column (4) of table 1 estimates a
version of column (2), with neighbors' taxes weighted by the inverse of their squared distance,
and interacted with a post-1992 dummy variable. Note that there is no need for a post-1992
dummy alone because the regression includes individual year dummies. While the reaction19
function coefficient for the period as a whole (0.157) is statistically insignificant, for the post-
1992 period it is positive and statistically significant. (The sum of the two coefficients (0.714) is
presented at the bottom of the table, along with its standard error.) Moreover, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation puts its elasticity at 1.10, slightly larger than for the stringency indices in
table 1.
Column (5) of table 2 does exactly the same exercise with the neighbors' taxes weighted
by tons of waste exported. Again the reaction function slope for the period as a whole is not
statistically different from zero, while post-1992 it is statistically significant, and of
approximately the same magnitude in elasticity terms as for column (4).
While certainly preliminary, the results in tables 1 and 2 suggest that states behave
strategically, reacting to other states' environmental standard stringency when setting their own.
Combined with recent evidence that environmental regulations do affect industry locations, and
the theoretical findings that interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition is inefficient except
under very specific circumstances, a strong case is emerging against devolving environmental
authority to subnational governments.
IV Conclusions and discussion
Any paper such as this must contain appropriate caveats. Let me simply point out two of
the most important. First, individual regions may not compete with one another but may instead
follow one or two innovators. In the context of tax competition, Altshuler and Goodspeed test
for whether European countries set capital tax rates in response to U.S. rates in a Stackleberg
model. In the context of environmental regulatory competition, Fredriksson and Millimet20
(2002b) test for whether U.S. states all follow California's lead when setting their environmental
standards.
Second, the specifications in tables 1 and 2 control for unobserved state heterogeneity
with fixed effects. This works so long as the source of heterogeneity is time-invariant. If all
states experience common time-varying shocks, those will be absorbed by the year fixed effects
in table 2, and they will be irrelevant in table 1 where the regulatory stringency measure averages
1.0 each year. However, if regional blocs of states experience unobservable time-varying
regional heterogeneity, that will bias the reaction function coefficient, providing spurious
evidence of strategic behavior. This problem is also present in Fredriksson and Millimet's work
and in the empirical tax competition literature. One obvious means to control for this would be
to include separate regional trends. That implies, however, that the researcher knows which
groups of states have coordinated policies, and that the correlated movements are unidirectional.
Future research in this area will need to confront the potential for regional time-varying
heterogeneity to bias our measurements of environmental reaction functions.
Despite the fact that much of this empirical literature is still forming, it is safe to draw
some preliminary conclusions. The theoretical literature on interjurisdictional environmental
regulatory competition is well established, and presents a laundry list of conditions necessary for
local regulations to be efficient. The conclusion must be that under most practical circumstances,
local environmental authority will lead to inefficient regulations. In practice, however, it is
unclear how strategically U.S. states behave with respect to each others' environmental
regulations. Recent evidence, including that presented here, suggests that states' environmental
regulations are strongly dependent on neighboring states' regulations. By itself, this competitive21
behavior is not inefficient. However, given the long list of necessary conditions for such
competition to lead to efficiency, it is highly unlikely that the strategic behavior we observe
results in Pareto-efficient standard setting.22
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Appendix: Index of State Abatement Costs
This discussion is taken from Levinson (2001). The state pollution cost index compares
the actual pollution abatement costs in each state, unadjusted for state industrial composition, to
the predicted abatement costs in each state, where the predictions are based solely on nationwide
abatement expenditures by industry and each state's industrial composition. Let the actual costs
per dollar of output be denoted
(A.1)
where Pst is pollution abatement costs in state s in year t,a n dYst is the manufacturing sector's
contribution to the gross state product (GSP) of state s in year t. By failing to adjust for the
industrial composition of each state, equation (A.1) likely overstates the compliance costs of
states with more pollution-intensive industries and understates the costs in states with relatively
clean industries.
To adjust for industrial composition, compare (A.1) to the predicted pollution abatement
costs per dollar of GSP in state s:
(A.2)
where industries are indexed from 20 through 39 following the 2-digit manufacturing SIC codes,
Yist is industry i's contribution to the GSP of state s at time t, Yit is the nationwide contribution of
industry i to national GDP, and Pit is the nationwide pollution abatement operating costs of
industry i.I n o t h e r w o r d s , S
^
st is the weighted average pollution abatement costs (per dollar of
GSP), where the weights are the relative shares of each industry in state s at time t.
To construct the industry-adjusted index of relative state stringency, Sst*, divide actual
expenditures in (A.1) by predicted expenditures in (A.2).
(A.3)
When Sst* is greater than 1, that indicates that industries in state s at time t spent more on
pollution abatement than those same industries in other states. When Sst*i sl e s st h a n1 ,
industries in state s at time t spent less on pollution abatement. By implication, states with large
values of Sst* have relatively more stringent regulations than states with small values of Sst*.26
Table 1.
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(0.295)
























































*Statistically significant at 5 percent.
†Statistically significant at 10 percent. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Regressions contain 48 state fixed effects and 816 observations (48 states, 17 yrs.).
Data sources: state regulatory stringency from Levinson (2001); population and unemployment rates
from the Census Bureau's Statistical Abstract of the United States; land values from USDA Economic
Research Service, Farm Real Estate Value; gross state product and personal income from Bureau of
Economic Analysis' Regional Account Data; wages from author's calculations using the current
population survey.27
Table 2.
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*Statistically significant at 5 percent.
†Statistically significant at 10 percent. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Regressions contain 48 state dummy variables, 7 year fixed effects, and 336 observations (48 states,
7y r s . ) .
Data sources: hazardous waste taxes from Tax Day, a Commerce Clearing House publication. For
other state characteristics see footnote to table 1.3
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